Apologies for not dropping this last week in the midst of site reboots and all, but I’m continuing the prior posts analyzing offensive trends from 2021-2024. Based on feedback from you scamps, I’m including high point summary of the findings first, then getting into the data deeper after.

Key Findings:

• 2023 had a slight uptick in points scored per game, rising slightly from 38.7 ppg to 38.8 ppg.
• Plays per game dropped by a point, yet yards per game rose by a yard compared to 2022.
• Despite a relatively equal numbers of plays per game, offensive pass yards per game from 279 in 2022 to 303 in 2023.
• Rush yards per game dropped in 2023, from 210 yards per game to 188 yards per game, despite only running an average of two fewer rushing plays per game compared to 2022.
• Offensive yards per play rose from 7.0 in 2022 to 7.2 in 2023.
• Georgia never had a turnover margin greater than -2 in a game in 2023, decreasing the average turnover margin from -.3 in 2022 to -.1 in 2023.
• Georgia rush yards per game fell below 4 ypr four times in 2023, compared to only twice in 2021-2022.
• Defensive points per game rose in 2023, from 12.4 in 2022 (6.9 in 2021) to 16.5.
• Defensive YPP rank for defenses the 2023 offense faced were lower than 2022, from 69.1 to 71.7 average ranking.
• Carson Beck would finish the season with a 72.42% completion percentage, the best in UGA history.

In other words, some metrics suggest that 2023 was a better offensive year than 2022, despite the regime change from Monken to Bobo. While the offense was arguably the same if not slightly better in 2023, the defense was trending in the opposite way compared to 2022.

The Data:

If you remove Ball State as an outlier, the only stretch of games where Georgia faced a series of tough defenses was from Missouri through Tennessee. The fact that Ole Miss had a serviceable defense blows my mind, considering what ensued that beautiful evening in Athens against Joey Freshwater’s side.

If you recall, this is the Georgia team that likely didn’t take the governor bar off of Carson until after the Auburn game (as evidenced by the Kentucky throttling against a good Kentucky offense where Georgia gained their second-highest yards with 608 and second-highest points with 51) and also had to unusual knack of having to have the other team score first before going into attack mode. Some games against lesser defensive squads – Florida, Vandy, and Tech, notably – were closer than we would like them to be, but the ones that were supposed to be tougher were ones where our side seemed to shine.

The Missouri game was the low-water mark for offensive yards in 2023, and was a tight game up until Nazir Stackhouse’s big man interception that helped to seal the deal.

Tech was a closer game than anticipated, although the season low in total plays, passing plays, and yards (20 for 175) suggests that the strategy was to play manball, control the clock, limit injuries, and get ready for the SECCG tilt with Alabama. Wished I could say it worked. Additionally, the true showing that somewhere within the game plan was the idea to bring Beck into the fold in a painfully slowly way is evidenced by the South Carolina game, which featured a middle of the pack defense, yet Georgia ran the highest number of plays (79) in 2023 and won the turnover battle with a +2 net for the game.

One thing that stands out about 2023 – the rushing yards per game. Whereas in 2021 and 2022, where the rushing yards per game dropped below 4 yards per rush twice (versus Clemson, 2021, and Tennessee, 2022), this measure was below 4 yards per rush 4 times. The running back room consisted of an on-again, off-again Milton, a steady and reliable Edwards, and the Robinsons and Andrew Paul, so there wasn’t a lack of talent. Given that Beck finished with a completion percentage record for the season, one can’t blame the OC for tipping towards Beck a little more than the running back room.

This is where perhaps the most legitimate gripe on Bobo could be levied for 2023. Concepts for rushing differ somewhat from Monken, although I’d argue that losing Darnell Washington in 2022 removed having the sixth offensive lineman/tight end hybrid from the running game, which is a really, really big piece to lose when it comes to rushing efficiency in 12 and 13 offensive sets that were employed heavily by Monken in 2021 and 2022. Perhaps it’s scheme, perhaps it’s talent, but it’s hard to erase memories of 2014 South Carolina from the collective head space of many a Georgia fan when it comes to Bobo’s playcalling.

What Does It All Mean?

Seeing as how the team was a slow-to-respond group, usually allowing the team to score first (seemed like every game, but the opposing team scored first in 7 contests) and that this team responded to heavier competition in a more aggressive and positive way, it seems to point to this:

Playing to the level of your competition.

While that’s fine when it works, it didn’t when Georgia faced Alabama in the SECCG. The season’s dark spaces with running efficiency exploded in the final game, with Georgia only eeking out 78 yards on the grond at 2.5 yards per rush. Georgia also lost the turnover battle at -1, and Saban would later unveil the secret sauce to stopping the Bulldogs: get Beck rattled. Carson had the game put on his back to win, and seemed rattled from the jump despite the Dawgs coming out and scoring first on a well-oiled, smooth drive. Questionable play calling (screens and screens) alongside the defense’s strategy to spy Milroe ultimately didn’t work, and Kirby’s group would end up pistol whipping the Criminoles in a bowl game. It was too little too late, as the Dawgs found themselves on the outside looking in as Alabama would not understand the assignment in the Rose Bowl and lose to Michigan…in what many argue would’ve been a Bulldog blowout had Georgia been in the mix with a healthy Bowers and McConkey.

We’ll never know…but from a statistical viewpoint, the offense wasn’t the biggest problem in 2023, but it would start a negative trend in the rushing game that would carry over into 2024.

Up Next: 2024, Who’s Fault Is It, Anyway?